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Episodic Object Representations
Introduction:
We can always count on the world to change. We must keep track of change in order to
know what to do now and what to do next. Despite similarities across multiple experiences, we
only directly experience the world as discrete events or episodes. In other words, we don’t
directly engage with schema, concepts, or categories. When we interact with the world, we
execute specific actions on specific objects at specific points in time. Therefore, we must
represent the contents of events, the particular objects we interact with, in episodic terms.
Specifically, we need to keep track of what happens to these objects in order to anticipate and
facilitate new states of the objects, our world and ourselves. Such precision necessitates the
formation and maintenance of dynamic object representations that are contingent upon our goals,
the current state of the object, and immediate situational constraints. These representations must
also be flexibly bound to other objects, past states, and to our knowledge of both the objects
themselves and the consequences of our behaviors. In other words, our object representations are
not confined to the current moment. Rather, they are dynamic trajectories of changes in state that
traverse time and space. This means that at any moment, our representation of each object
contains a history of the relevant prior events it was involved in. The object’s own changes in
state as well as its associations and interactions with other objects within and across events
through time constitute this history and overlapping interacting object histories typify events
(Altmann & Ekves, 2019).
Even though such dynamic representations of experience are fundamental for
understanding itself, little is known about how we develop the ability to keep track of the
changes that occur to the objects we encounter. The present study is the first, to our knowledge,
to explore when the ability to represent objects as trajectories of token-states that traverse space
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and time first emerges in childhood. That is, we are asking when do children first exhibit the
propensity to represent objects as tokens, as defined by their unique histories, or trajectories, of
change? The question of tokenization is a tricky one. In order to accurately identify when the
ability to represent an object in terms of its history we have identified 2 minimum requirements
that the developing cognitive system must fulfill in order to support such dynamic
representations of experience. These include the ability to:
1) recognize that a particular token remains the same token despite changes in its location
or state
2) flexibly incorporate these transient changes in state (in the form of previous tokenstates and anticipated future states) into the token representation

Knowing an object at one point in time is the same object despite change is an important
precursor to tracking the history of an object because it requires maintaining prior token states in
memory and comparing them to novel perceptual input. When the current perceptual input is
very different from previous input, it could indicate a change in state of a single object or the
existence of a novel object. Thus, in order to accurately respond to new input, it is important to
know when a single object simply changed state and when to form a distinct token representation
for a new object. In addition to knowing that the objects we encounter are the same object
despite changes in appearance, location, time, or even task demands, we also need to update our
representations in response to transient changes in the state of a token from one moment to the
next. Change entails new behaviors, and new consequences. Therefore, we must actively adjust
our representations to incorporate new information what happens to these specific objects to
successfully understand and interact with the world both in the here and now and in the future.
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For example, when baking a cake, you must bind the current perceptual input specifying the fully
baked cake to the internal representation of its previous unbaked state. By incorporating both
states of the object into a single representation of its identity we can recognize that the batter we
had mixed earlier is the same cake that we just removed from the oven. It is also not enough to
know that the batter and the baked cake are the same object despite undergoing a change in state
and location. We must also recognize that this isn’t just any cake, it is a particular cake not
interchangeable with other cakes. Therefore, we must also update our representation of the cake
because it changed. We must know that the unbaked and baked cakes are different states of the
same cake but each state in its trajectory of change affords different interactions. For instande,
the cake that is now baked and edible was once an inedible mixture of ingredients.
At first glance, it seems likely that the of ability to represent objects in terms of their
histories would emerge during the first year of life in parallel with the emergence of object
permanence. After all, knowing that a particular object continues to exist despite occlusion, or
movement requires knowing that the object was “here” and now its “there”. The representational
capacity putatively referred to as “object permanence” can be observed in infants as young as 4
months of age with developmental improvements in the flexibility and precision of these
representations continue throughout the first year of life (Baillargeon, 1987; Smith & Thelan,
2003). Evidence for such early emergence stem from violation of expectation intermodal
preferential looking (IPL) paradigms in which objects are either concealed by a screen or hidden
in an opaque container and subsequently revealed. Infants must use the information provided
(e.g. the spatiotemporal trajectory and/or the features of the objects) to form expectations about
the number of objects participating in the occlusion event. Looking patterns and search behavior
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(e.g. number of reaches to retrieve the objects) serve as an index of infants’ expectations about
the concealed objects.
In a series of studies, Xu and Carey (1996) showed that preverbal infants capitalize on the
predictable nature of spatiotemporal continuity to individuate perceptual features into
numerically separable entities and keep track of them across occlusion events or changes in
location. In their first study, 10-month-old infants watched two objects (e.g. a rubber duck and a
toy car) simultaneously emerge from and return behind a single screen. Then, the screen was
lowered to reveal either two objects (expected outcome) or one object (unexpected outcome).
Based on observed differences in the infants’ looking patterns during the expected and
unexpected outcome condition, Xu and Carey (1996) concluded that the infants used
spatiotemporal continuity to correctly individuate two objects. That is, infants knew that a single
object could not be in two places at once and could use this knowledge to generate expectations
about the number of objects that should be occluded by the screen. Knowing two things should
exist does not necessarily entail representing their identity or even what happened to them.
Infants in this paradigm only had to generate expectations about the number of entities that
should be behind the screen. This task did not assess whether or not the objects that were initially
hidden were the same objects that were subsequently revealed. Thus, infants did not have to
track the episodic histories of the specific object because they did not have to know that each
object was “here” and moved “there” or the order in which the objects were hidden, only that
there should be 2 objects “there” now.
In their second manipulation, Xu & Carey (1996) showed that during the first year of life,
infants use spatiotemporal continuity to parse cluttered perceptual into coherent, numerically
separable entities divorced from identity. This time, 10-month-old infants watched one object
4
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(e.g. the duck) emerge from and return behind the screen. Then, they watched a second object
(e.g. the car) emerge from and return behind the same screen. The infants expected only one
object, not two objects, to be revealed when the screen was lowered because the spatiotemporal
trajectory (only 1 object was in view at a time) was only indicative of the existence of at least 1
object. This means that without clear spatiotemporal evidence, 10-month-old infants could not
generate accurate expectations about the number of hidden objects even when those objects
possessed clearly different features. Spatiotemporal continuity is informative for individuating
the existence of numerically separable entities, and generating expectations about the number of
objects that participate in an event. But, spatiotemporal information is not enough to facilitate
encoding of the identity of the individuated objects such that they are not interchangeable with
other objects. Consequently, spatiotemporal continuity alone is not sufficient to support object
representations that can flexibly accumulate an episodic history. Feature information provides
important cues to the identity of a particular object. Therefore, featural information (in addition
to spatiotemporal information) is necessary to accurately compare representation of the previous
input to the current perceptual input. Without encoding featural information into an object
representation, it is impossible to know that the particular object at one point in time is the same
object despite changes in location or state. Therefore, preverbal infants do not represent objects
as unique tokens capable of accumulating an episodic history because they could not maintain
feature information in their object representations. However, 12-month-old infants can use
features indicative of category membership to correctly infer that 2 objects should be concealed
by the screen as long as the objects belong to different categories. When both objects belong to a
single category (e.g. a dump truck and a tow truck or a big cup and a small cup), 12-month olds
fail to individuate the correct number of objects even if those objects possess different features
5
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(Xu, Carey, & Quint, 2004). Infants used type-specific information to individuate objects
belonging to different categories, but represent all members of a single category as a single
individual. Thus, without clear and persistent spatiotemporal evidence, even infants with
category knowledge fail to represent multiple tokens belonging to a single category as unique
individuals not interchangeable with other members of that category. Because infants consider
all members of a category to be interchangeable, they could not use within kind feature contrast
to keep track of the correct number of objects involved in an occlusion event. For similar studies,
see e.g. Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, & Wein, 1995; Wynn, 1992; and Xu & Carey, 2001 for
review.
The acquisition of categorical knowledge after the first year of life fundamentally
changes how infants individuate and represent objects and events by providing a structure by
which to organize, understand, and identify incoming perceptual information. Categories
improve the resolution at which infants can represent experience because they facilitate
rudimentary object-centered representations: When infants encounter objects in their
environment, category knowledge biases attention towards relevant perceptual features for
classification purposes (Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002). Infants
can readily bind together collections of perceptual features indicative of category membership
and object features that do not match a known category can also be more easily segregated (Xu
& Carey, 1996; Carey & Xu, 2001). Feigenson et al., 2003 showed that 14-month-old infants are
insensitive to within-kind property differences during occlusion events. For example, after
watching an experimenter hide 3 small balls in a box, infants do not continue to search for
additional objects if they retrieve 2 small balls and 1 big ball. This means infants can represent
the correct number of objects involved in the task, but they cannot detect mismatches between
6
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the identities of the objects hidden and those of the objects that were subsequently revealed.
However, this task provided infants with clear spatiotemporal evidence for the number of objects
participating in the event and did not include a condition where the retrieved objects did not
belong to the same category as the hidden objects. Therefore, it is unclear if the infants were
actually even maintaining type membership in their object representations.
An extension of this last study suggests that it is not until 18 months of age that infants
can maintain object representations that include identity at the level of category membership
across changes in location or occlusion events: Zosh and Feigenson (2012) attempted to assess
whether or not 18-month-old infants realized that the objects that they initially watched being
hidden in a box, were the same objects they subsequently retrieved from the same box. 18month-old infants watched an experimenter place 1,2, or 3 objects into a box (each object
belonged to a different category). Before allowing the infants to retrieve the objects, the
experimenter secretly replaced either one or all of the objects inside the box (thereby changing
the identity of the objects). Objects could switch identity from one type to another (e.g. from cat
to car) or even lose object status by switching from solid to nonsolid substance (from cat to
gelatinous blob). When infants only had to maintain 1 or 2 object representations in memory,
they could detect a mismatch between their expectations about the objects inside the box (based
on prior representations of the objects) and the actual objects they retrieved. Search behavior
depended on the total number of objects hidden inside the box but not the number of objects
within a set that changed identity. In other words, infants searched for the same amount of time
when only one of the hidden objects changed identity as they did when all of the hidden objects
changed identity. Infants did not remember the 3-object set well enough to detect a type-level
mismatch between the hidden and retrieved objects. But, after watching only 1 or 2 objects
7
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being hidden in the box, infants continued to search after detecting type level mismatches. This
suggests that 18-month-old infants can encode and retain type-based representations for a finite
number of hidden objects and compare these prior representations to new perceptual information
provided by the retrieved objects.
Individuating objects on the basis of type membership is advantageous for generalizing
learned behavior to novel contexts and for generating more accurate expectations or predictions
about unfolding events. But, type based object representations lack the precision necessary to
represent objects as trajectories of token-states. In order to form token representations that can
flexibly acquire an episodic history, infants must discriminate between objects of the same type
as well as maintain and update these representations across changes in state, shifts in location or
context, and switches in attention. Zosh and Feigenson (2012) did not include conditions that
manipulated within category changes in identity. Therefore, it did not address whether or not the
infants were sensitive to within-type changes to identity. But, successful performance in this task
was dependent upon the level of feature contrast (Zosh & Feigenson, 2012). Therefore, it is
unlikely that 18-month old infants would be sensitive to within-kind changes in identity at the
level of individual tokens because feature differences between tokens of the same type are less
obvious than feature differences between tokens different types.
Using a forced choice paradigm, Ganea, Shutts, Spelke, and Delouche (2007) provided
tentative evidence to suggest that infants cannot adjust representations of specific tokens based
on described changes to those objects until they reach 22 months of age. In this study, 19 and 22month-old infants were introduced to “Lucy” the stuffed frog. The experimenter then took
“Lucy” out of view and explained to the infants that she had dropped “Lucy” in a bucket of water
and gotten her all wet. The infants were then presented with 3 objects. 2 of these objects were
8
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stuffed frogs that were otherwise identical except that one was wet and one was dry. The third
object was a different stuffed animal that was also wet. The infants were asked to find “Lucy”.
Older infants (22 months) correctly chose the wet frog while younger infants chose the dry frog
(Ganea et al., 2007). The researchers concluded that by 2 years of age, infants can use linguistic
and perceptual evidence to recognize and update a prior representation of a familiar object to
reflect a change in state even when the change event was not seen by the infant. This suggests
that, like the 18-month olds in Zosh and Feigenson (2012), these 19-month-old infants could
maintain an initial object representation (at least at the type-level), but could not detect update
this internal representation in response to external input. Ganea and colleagues (2007) did not
include a within category contrast condition where infants had to choose between “Lucy” and
another different stuffed frog. Thus, it was not clear if the infants could even form and distinct
maintain distinct token representations in the first place. That is, it was not clear if these infants
were representing “Lucy” as a particular stuffed frog (a token) or just as any stuffed frog (a
type). In fact, the infants did not need to track the previous states of the object at all in order to
make the correct choice in the study. Instead, they could have relied on semantic knowledge
triggered by language cues used to describe the change (e.g. “wet”) and the presence of explicit
visual cues to the change (e.g. the water) to infer the current state of the object. In other words,
the infants did not need to know that Lucy is a particular stuffed frog who was dry and now she
is wet, they only needed to know that Lucy is a stuffed frog that is wet. Although the ability to
flexibly adjust representations of particular objects to accommodate new information or changes
in state did not emerge in this study until 22 months, it is not even clear that the ability had truly
emerged (that is, the ability to bind the ‘later’ representation of the frog with its earlier self). That
remains to be tested.
9

Episodic Object Representations
Tokenization requires representing an object as a unique instance of a particular type that
is not substitutable with other members of the same type. While type membership affords
representations of what can and cannot happen, a token’s episodic history, its trajectory of
change, makes it distinct from other tokens that belong to the same category. Even objects that
are virtually identical in appearance and/or function possess unique histories because particular
objects participate in particular events. Each token’s idiosyncratic and ever-changing history is
an inherent and necessary component of its unique identity. To successfully complete virtually
any task in our cluttered world, we must simultaneously generalize on the basis of type and
discriminate between members of the same type on the basis of their episodic histories (even if
those tokens are identical). For example, if you are thirsty during a dinner party, it is not enough
to know that cups afford drinking or even to individuate the existence of multiple cups with
unique spatial locations around the table. You must distinguish between identical cups on the
basis of what has happened to the them in order to know which cup to drink from. Therefore,
accurate discrimination between 2 identical tokens solely on the basis of their episodic history is
the minimum behavior necessary for a child to demonstrate to show they have acquired the
capacity to represent objects as trajectories of changes in token-states. The few studies that have
explored the developing ability to distinguish between identical or highly similar tokens suggest
that the ability to precisely represent the identity of a particular object does not emerge until the
early preschool years.
When provided with clear and persistent spatiotemporal evidence for the existence of
multiple individuals of a single category (e.g. they are simultaneously presented and occupy
distinct locations in space), 12-month-old infants can represent each object as a distinct token
and interact accordingly in the moment (Feigenson, Carey, & Spelke, 2002; Feigenson, Carey, &
10
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Hauser, 2002). But, these representations are inflexible and fragile because they cannot
accumulate episodic history. 1-year old infants can reliably represent and compare across 2
unique tokens (or sets of tokens) belonging to the same category in order to specifically select 1
token over the other (Feigenson, Carey, & Spelke, 2002). However, they cannot update these
token representations in response to changes in state or location, nor even maintain their initial
token representations despite change (Moher & Feigenson, 2013; Feigenson & Yamaguchi,
2009). In addition, these young infants seem unable to utilize a highly salient history of repeated
exposure to a specific object-action relation in conjunction with unambiguous spatiotemporal
cues, to generate expectations about future events involving the token. Instead of forming an
association between a particular object-directed action and the particular token that is the target
of that action, infants associate the behavior with the type of object involved. (Spaepen & Spelke,
2007). This means that infants cannot even incorporate a semantic history (a specific objectaction relation learned over repeated trials) with an existing token representation. Instead, they
incorporate prior experience into their object representations at the level of type membership
such that they can only form expectations about possible future events involving a type of object.
For example, in Spaepen and Spelke, 2007, 12-month-old infants were presented with 2 objects
belonging to the same category arranged side-by-side on a stage. The infants watched as an
experimenter repeatedly reached towards 1 of the objects. The experimenter always reached for
the same object during the familiarization period. Even though the experimenter never reached
for the alternative during familiarization, the infants were not surprised when the experimenter
reached for the alternative object in the test phase. This suggests that 1-year old infants consider
any member belonging to the same category as the original object as a viable target of future
reaches. Thus, even with discriminable spatial information and repeated highly specific
11
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experience and spatiotemporal evidence, 12-month-old infants are unable flexibly associate
specific objects with their specific histories.
Gelman and colleagues (2014) showed that by 3 years of age, children possess a fragile
capacity to represent objects as unique instances or tokens (distinct from other visually identical
alternatives) that are capable of collecting a unique episodic history. In their first experiment, the
researchers presented 3-year olds and adults sets of 3 novel objects arranged side-by-side on a
table. The properties of the sets were manipulated across trials such that all of the objects in each
set of 3 could either be the same shape but different colors or completely identical in all aspects
of appearance. The experimenters also manipulated the semantic relevance of the objects. In the
ownership condition, the experimenter denoted ownership status to one of the objects in the set
(e.g. this is yours). Then, participants watched as the experimenter shuffled the spatial placement
of the objects (e.g. the owned object and another object switched places). Immediately after this
spatiotemporal transformation, the participants were asked to point to ‘their’ object. They were
queried second time after a delay only on trials with sets of objects that were of different colors.
The structure of the labeling condition was identical that of the ownership condition. But, rather
than assigning ownership, the experimenter labeled a particular object in the set (e.g. “this is a
sarn”) and subsequently queried with this label (e.g. “where is the sarn?”). They found that adults
performed equally well in all conditions. Children performed above chance (33%) on immediate
retrieval queries for every condition. But the 3-year old’s could remember the history of the
target token (in both the identical and color varying object sets) more accurately when the
experimenter designated ownership status to one of the objects than when the object was only
labeled. In fact, they selected the correct object in less than half of the trials within the label
condition. Whereas in the ownership condition, children accurately responded 75% of the time.
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The children were also more accurate in trials with sets where each object varied in color than
when presented with sets of identical objects regardless of whether they were in the ownership or
label condition. But, a separate difference in average score on color-varying and identical sets for
the ownership and label conditions was not included in this analysis. After a brief delay,
children could only remember the spatial location of target objects that had been assigned
ownership status and were part of color-varying sets. That is, even with obvious perceptual cues
(different colors), the children’s token representations could not withstand a brief shift in
attention. Most importantly, even though the objects in each set were identical or highly similar
and belonged to the same unfamiliar category, 3-year olds did not generalize the label to other
members of the same category. Instead, they could not only represent the target individual as
distinct from the other identical alternatives but also could keep track of its episodic history (its
unique spatiotemporal trajectory). These results also imply that early episodic representational
capacity is likely facilitated by highly salient semantic information, such as ownership while
adults track both arbitrary and nonarbitrary episodic history. Preschool aged children
demonstrate a fragile propensity learn arbitrary details about specific tokens they encounter after
a single experience and momentarily keep track of their spatiotemporal trajectory. But, these
representations are unreliable because they are vulnerable to switches in attention and the
passage of time.
In another series of studies, Gelman and colleagues (2012, 2015) show that by 3 years of
age, children show a weak inclination to use nonobvious perceptual cues indicative of a
particular object’s unique history of state change to make ownership judgments (Gelman,
Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2015). In these studies, an experimenter showed preschool children
identical objects and designated one for the child and another for someone else. Toddlers
13
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observed the experimenter make a small nonobvious mark on the child’s particular object before
removing both objects from view. The child was then presented with both identical objects, and
told to identify which one they owned. Even when the perceptual traces were inconspicuous, and
not directly referenced by the experimenter, children still spontaneously encoded the marking
event as part of the object’s history and used this history to determine ownership as evidenced by
their search patterns. However, when the objects were not identical, children did not search for
the mark as often and instead relied on the obvious perceptual differences. However, with
increasing age, children became more and more likely to use historical cues to identify objects
assigned to them both in tasks that require historical knowledge and in task that do not. Clearly
the early preschool years are characterized by increasing ability to associate individual objects
with their unique histories. Critically, in an earlier study, Gelman and colleagues (2012)
illustrated that 2-year-old toddlers could not reliably use historical traces or spatial information
to differentiate between otherwise identical objects at all. These young toddlers also conflated
desirability with ownership when differentiating between 3 objects that belonged to different
categories. (Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012). Thus, it is not until at least 3 years of age that
children seem to begin to encode the idiosyncratic contingencies that make up an object’s unique
history of change and subsequently use this history to inform their understanding of the current
event. The primitive form of the ability to represent objects as dynamic trajectories of change is
contingent upon salient semantic information. Events that evoke highly meaningful semantic
relevance, such as ownership designations, increase the salience of cooccurring arbitrary details.
Thus, this arbitrary history is more likely to be encoded and maintained because of its relevant
semantic associations. However, these studies did not explore if and when children can
discriminate between multiple historical representations belong to multiple different objects. If
14
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events are indeed represented as aggregates of overlapping interacting object histories, children
must be able to simultaneously attend to, associate, and individuate multiple historical
representations at the object level within an episode and at the event level across episodes.
Finally, the observed memory advantage for self-owned items, and adult participant’s tendency
to examine the objects in trials with and without marking events warrants further examination of
the emerging ability to represent objects in terms of their unique histories.

Tracking Object Histories – Experimental Studies
To gain insight into when the ability to represent specific objects in terms of their unique
histories first emerges in childhood, we asked children between 2 and 4 years of age to choose
between two identical objects on the basis of their unique histories of state change. We structured
our task as a novel game in order to ensure we were reliably evoking the emerging ability to keep
track of and represent objects as trajectories of change in its purest form. In our paradigm, the
objects (and their histories) were relevant to the task context but did not carry personal value to
participants themselves. Unlike Ganea and collegues (2007) mentioned above, the objects in our
studies possessed unique histories (their color changes) but remained otherwise perceptually
identical which, along with the novel context, prevented participants from relying entirely on
systematic cues or prior semantic knowledge to complete the task. Unlike Gelman and
colleagues (2012, 2015), we also gave both objects a unique history so that within each trial or
event, the children had to differentiate between competing visually and historically similar
representations in order to select the correct object. Across trials, task demands remained
constant but each trial involved unique but perceptually identical stimuli. In addition, the spatial
location of the placement of the objects and temporal order of the transformations were
15
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counterbalanced. In this way, we could investigate children’s ability to form dynamic and
hierarchical representations of their experiences.

Method:
This paradigm was centered around a novel game context. The goal of the game was to
feed very hungry but very picky monster puppets, named Rom and Bam. Their “food” was
actually colored wooden balls. We used a “magic” box (box with Ipad that plays an animation of
balls changing from blue to red or yellow) to figure out which food is yummy and which food is
yucky. We initially presented participants with 2 blue balls that when placed in the “magic” box
(one at a time) briefly changed color (red or yellow) before becoming blue again. “Yumminess”
and “Yuckiness” were defined by these transient color change animations. We asked participants
to point to “yummy” object. Participants had correctly associate each history of color change to
the correct object and remember the semantic mapping between color and “yumminess” in order
to decide which of the 2 blue balls to feed Rom. That is, the participants had to discriminate
between 2 identical tokens based solely on their unique episodic histories of color
transformation.

Participants:
Forty-eight children between 2 and 4 years of age (N = 48; range = 22 - 52 months, M =
36.4) )) participated in this study. An additional 6 participants were enrolled but their data was
excluded due to inattention (2), experimenter error (3), parental interference (2), or failure to
meet inclusionary requirements (1). All participants were typically developing, monolingual
children with normal or corrected to normal hearing and vision. Participants were recruited from
16
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a departmental database of families who indicated potential willingness to participate in research.
The majority of which were white, middle-class families living in central or eastern Connecticut.
Children received a small giftupon completion of the session.

Materials:
Stimuli included wooden balls (2.5inches in diameter) colored red, blue, or yellow, two
monster puppets (one red and one blue), a wooden box with an iPad replacing the front panel,
and two plastic cups to prevent the balls from rolling across the table. Videos of the balls
changing color (3-7 seconds in duration) were presented via the iPad.

Procedure:
Each child participated in a single experimental session between fifteen and twenty
minutes in duration. Each session consisted of three phases: familiarization, training, and test.
Thirty-four sessions took place in a laboratory testing room and four sessions took place in quiet
rooms at the participants’ respective daycares or preschools. All sessions were video recorded.
During the session, the experimenter sat opposite the participate at a table. The box was placed in
the center of the table with the iPad facing the child. The plastic cups were placed six inches to
the left and right sides of the box (see figure 1). Parents were given the option to sit with their
children but were instructed to refrain from helping their child complete the task. A second
experimenter sat behind the child, and recorded their responses to each trial.

17
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Familiarization:
The purpose of the familiarization phase was to introduce participants to the stimuli and
explain the goal of the task which was structured as a novel game. First, the experimenter
introduced the monster puppets as Rom and Bam, the very hungry but very picky monsters who
only ate “special” food. Participants were given the opportunity to briefly touch or hold the
puppets. Then, the experimenter presented the child with a red ball and explained it was
“yummy” food before pretending to feed it to one of the puppets, Bam, who gobbled it up. Then,
she presented the child with a yellow ball explained that it was “yucky” food before pretending
to feed it to Bam, who closed his mouth and shook his head. The experimenter did not provide
verbal cues to the colors or shape of the stimuli at any point in the session. After introducing the
“yummy” and “yucky” food, the experimenter gestured to the box, and explained that they were
going to play a game with the “magic” box to find the “yummy” food.

Training Phase:
The purpose of the training phase was to familiarize participants with the task structure
and reinforce their memory for the “yummy” and “yucky” food. The training phase consisted of
a minimum of 4 forced-choice two-alternative trials between objects with obvious perceptual
cues to their identity. Each trial always consisted of a choice between a “yummy” and a “yucky”
object. Each trial progressed as follows. First, the experimenter showed the participant a blue
ball and placed it inside the magic box. Then, the child was encouraged to touch the green button
on the iPad screen that initiated the first change video. The child then watched a video of the
blue ball changing color to red. The experimenter then retrieved a red ball from the box and
placed it in an adjacent plastic cup out of reach from the child. Then the experimenter showed
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the child another blue ball and placed it in box. The child was again encouraged to initiate the
change video by touching the green button on the iPad screen. The second video was identical to
the first video except the blue ball turned yellow. The experimenter then retrieved a yellow ball
and placed it in the other empty cup. Then, the experimenter asked the child to point to the
“yummy” food. Every trial contained a blue-yellow and a blue-red change, but the order of the
changes was counterbalanced both across trials within a session and across sessions. Feedback
was given after each trial. If the child chose the red ball, the experimenter verbally assured the
child that they were correct and pretended that Bam enjoyed eating the food. (e.g. Good job!
You’re right, that is yummy food! Let’s watch Bam eat the yummy food!) If the child incorrectly
chose the yellow ball, the experimenter explained to the child that it was “yucky” food and
pretended that Bam refused to eat it. Then, the experimenter reminded the child that the other
choice was “yummy” (e.g. Uh-oh, that’s yucky food! See, Bam says No no!, yuck yuck! But this
is yummy food! Watch Bam eat the yummy food! Mmm mmm yummy yummy!). Upon
completion of all four training trials, the experimenter reminded the child what “yummy” and
“yucky” food looks like one more time before moving on to the test phase.
A follow-up assessment was administered to participants who failed to learn the semantic
mapping within the 4 training trials. The experimenter showed the child a red ball and prompted
the participant to verbally identify that it was “yummy”. The experimenter reinforced the correct
response with verbal affirmation and by pretending to have Bam eat it. Then the experimenter
showed the child a yellow ball and prompted the participant to verbally identify that it was
“yucky”. Again, the experimenter reinforced the correct response with verbal affirmation and by
pretending to have Bam refuse to eat it. Participants that consistently failed each trial on the
training phase were excluded from the analysis if they could not demonstrate an understanding of
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the rules after this follow up assessment. Only 2 participants required this additional training and
they exhibited knowledge of the correct semantic mapping after just a single query. Therefore,
all participants successfully learned the rules of the game by the conclusion of the training
session.

Test Phase:
The test phase consisted of between 8 and 12 trials in total. Pilot data suggested that
children tended to lose interest, forget the rules, or become confused after multiple repetitions of
the test trials. Therefore, we restricted the first analysis, to the first 4 test trials where the child
demonstrated sustained attention. No feedback was provided to participants after any of these
first 4 test trials, regardless of whether the child chose correctly or incorrectly.
Trials 5 to 12 were used to give, and assess the benefits of, feedback to a proportion of
the children (no feedback was provided after each of the first 4 trials). 4 participants dropped out
after completing trials 1-4. Their data is not included in this analysis. A subset of participants
did not receive feedback at all during the test phase (range = 28-52months, N= 16, M=37.6). The
participants in the no feedback group completed a total of 8 test trials. The second group of
participants (range = 22-52months, N= 28, M=35.04) endured a total of 12 test trials because
they received feedback following their responses in trials 5-8, and completed a third set of 4 test
trials (trials 9-12) without feedback. They are reported in Analysis 2 below.
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Trials 1 – 4
Like the training phase, the test phase consisted of forced choice two-alternative trials
between a “yummy” and “yucky” object (see figure 1). However, unlike the training phase, the
objects did not possess perceptual cues to their identity, they looked exactly the same.
Participants needed to remember each object’s unique history of state-change in order to make
the correct selection. Each trial consisted of the following steps: First, the experimenter put Bam
out of sight, and presented Rom to the participant. The experimenter explained that Rom eats
“yummy food just like Bam” and that now they were going to use the “magic box” to feed Rom
but Rom’s food is “extra-special” because it is “extra-hidden”. The experimenter then put Rom
out of sight and placed a blue ball into the box. But this time, the child watched a video of the
ball changing from blue to red/yellow and then back to blue. When the ball was turning back to
blue, the experimenter emphasized the shift back to blue in order to keep the child’s attention
and reinforce their understanding of the task (e.g. Look at that! See, it’s extra-hidden!).
Afterwards, the experimenter retrieved the blue ball from the box and placed it in one of the
adjacent cups. Then, the process was repeated with a second identical blue ball but with the
alternate color change video. After the second color change, the child was asked to identify
which of the identical blue balls was “yummy” food. That is, they had to select the blue ball that
had been red. No feedback was given to participants after any of these first four test trials,
regardless of whether the child chose correctly or incorrectly.
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Figure 1: Visual representation of paradigm structure

Trials 5-8: Feedback
After 20 participants had completed this study, we began to wonder if the low success
rate could be attributed to lack of understanding rather than lack of ability. That is, participants
may have been able to track the history of an object but simply could not infer that “yumminess”
was a persistent and intrinsic property of the object that did not require explicit perceptual cues.
Although all participants demonstrated understanding of the arbitrary mapping between the color
of the stimuli and “yumminess”, and the link between the training and test phase was explicitly
explained to participants before the test phase was administered, it is still possible that some
participants failed to understand the expectations of the task. We provided a subset of
participants (range = 22 – 52 months, N = 28, M=35.1) with explicit feedback after their
responses on each trial within the second block of 4 test trials (e.g. trials 5 – 8). Following the
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block of trials with feedback, these participants experienced a third and final block of 4 test trials
in which no feedback was provided. The other set of the participants did not receive feedback on
trials 5 – 8 and did not complete a third block of 4 test trials (range = 28-52months, N= 16,
M=37.5). That is, they did not complete trials 9-12.
As mentioned above, the second block of 4 test trials were identical as the first block of
trials except that feedback was provided to a subset of participants after each trial. Order of
transformations within each trial and across trials was counterbalanced so that it was
unpredictable. When a participant chose correctly to a trial within the feedback set, the
experimenter verbally confirmed their correct response and provided additional reinforcement by
pretending to feed the puppet the correct stimuli (e.g. “Good job, that’s right. This is yummy!
Let’s watch Rom eat the yummy one! Rom says Yum Yum Yum”). When participants chose
incorrectly during test trials within the feedback set, the experimenter verbally corrected the
child and reinforced the correct choice by pretending to feed the puppet (e.g. “Oh no! That is the
yucky one!” “This one is yummy! See Rom eat the yummy one! Rom says Yum Yum Yum!”).

Trials 9-12: Post-feedback
The third (final) block of 4 test trials was also identical in structure to the first although
again, the order of transformations within each trial and across trials was counterbalanced.
Participants did not receive feedback after each trial in this block.

Coding:
Videos were coded for explicit response accuracy and compared with the record sheet for
each participant. In order to ensure reliability, 50% of the videos were independently coded by a
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second research assistant without access to the record sheet and compared with the initial pass.
Mean percentage of agreement between the coders was 96%.

Scoring:
Participants received separate scores for both the training and the test phases.
Performance was based on explicit response (e.g. pointing or reaching). For both the training and
test phases, participants received an accuracy score calculated as the percentage of correct
responses out of the four total trials completed. One point was awarded for every correct
response and the highest possible score for each phase was 4/4 or 100%. We also assigned each
participant categorical scores indicating overall success or failure in each phase. Participants
were given a 1 if they successfully completed ¾ or 75% of the test trials. A 0 was assigned to
participants with accuracy scores of 0/4, ¼ , or 2/4.

Results:
Training Phase:
Age as a continuous variable did not predict performance in the training phase (F(1,46) =
2.34, p = .133). Likewise, performance in the training phase did not predict performance in the
test phase (F(2,45) = 4.98, p = .113).

Results: Analysis 1
Test phase: initial 4 trials (Trials 1-4)
Performance on the first 4 trials of the test phase improved with age. A general linear
regression analysis revealed that age as a continuous interval significantly predicted score on the
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first 4 trials of the test phase (R(46)= .36, F(1,46) =7.096, p = .01; see figure 2). These data suggest
that marked improvement in children’s ability to successfully discriminate between visually
identical objects based solely on their history occurs during the early preschool years. The ability
to represent changes in the state of an object begins to emerge by around 30 months of age and
can be reliably observed in behavior by 52 months. 1

Figure 2: Linear relationship between age and score (final response) on trials 1-4

We observed a significant linear relationship between test score (final responses) and age as a continuous interval
(black line). Participants were grouped into quartiles (n=12), and the means for each quartile (large colored dots) are
superimposed on the trend line. The scores for each individual participant are represented by the small colored
2

points. The dotted line at y = 50% represents chance performance.

1

Fitting a nonlinear function (for exponential growth curve) to the regression equation accounts for almost the same
amount of variance as the linear function (F(1,46)= 6.17, p = .017, R2 = .12; see Figure A1 in Appendix A)
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A few participants (n=5) switched their initial choice without receiving any input from
the experimenter. Scores in the above analysis reflect participants final response. We ran a
second linear regression on participants’ scores calculated according to initial responses (see
figure 3) before the participants changed their selection. Again, age as a continuous interval
significantly predicted score on the first 4 trials (R(46)= .35, F(1,46) =6.35, p = .016). The data are
very similar.

Figure 3: Positive linear relationship between age and score (initial response) on trials 1-4

We observed a significant linear relationship between test score (initial responses) and age as a continuous interval
(black line). Participants were grouped into quartiles (n=12), and the means for each quartile (large colored dots) are
superimposed on the trend line. The scores for each individual participant are represented by the small colored
points. The dotted line at y = 50% represents chance performance.
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We then divided the participants into 2 age groups along a median split ( <37months:
range =22-36months, n = 24, M = 30.25; >37months: range = 37-52months, n = 24, M = 42.6).
T-tests revealed that the younger group’s scores did not significantly differ from chance (M =
50%; t(23)= 0, p=1) but on average, participants in older group scored above chance (M = 62%;
t(23)=2.04, p=.027; see figure 4). 3

Figure 4: Age group differences in average score

This graph shows the average score for the initial 4 trials for each age group. The dotted line at y = 50% represents
chance performance (a score of 2/4). The average score of participants >37 months was 50% and the average score
of participants <37 months was 62%.

3

Due to the high probability of selecting the correct object by chance (50%) and small number of trials, we also ran
a chi2 analysis on these data. This analysis confirmed results from the T-tests. Significantly more participants in the
older group completed the task successfully compared to the younger group (X2(1, N = 48) = 9.38, p=.002). For a
graph of the chi2 square results see figure 2 in the appendix.
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Results: Analysis 2
Test Phase: pre-Feedback vs post-feedback
Trials 5 to 12 were used to give, and assess the benefits of, feedback to a proportion of
the children (range = 22-52months, N= 28, M=35.04 months). No feedback was provided after
each of the first 4 trials nor following responses in trials 9-12. We compared scores on the first
block of 4 test trials to scores on the final block of 4 test trials to ascertain whether or not
feedback had an effect on performance. Paired sample t-tests revealed that scores on the first
block did not differ significantly from scores on the last block of test trials (t(27)=0, p=1, figure
5). Overall, the average score on trials 5-8 also did not significantly deviate from the average
score on trials 1-4 (t(27)=.39, p=.697) nor from the average score on trials 9-12 (post-feedback
(t(27)=-0.45, p=.658; figure 5).

Figure 5: Impact of feedback on average score

This graph shows the average scores of all participants in the feedback group(n=28) before, during, and after
receiving feedback. The average score after receiving feedback (Trials 9-12: Post-feedback M = 54%) was not
significantly different from the average score on the initial 4 trials (Trials 1-4: pre-feedback M = 54%) nor from the
average score on trials 5-8 (M = 52%
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GLM analysis with score on the last 4 trials as the outcome revealed that age as a
continuous interval was a significant predictor of score on the last 4 test trials (post-feedback)
(R(26)=.42, F(1,26) = 5.42, p=.028) in this sample. Score on the initial set of 4 test trials (prefeedback) was not a significant predictor of score on the last 4 test trials (post-feedback) after
controlling for age (F(2,25) =3.74, p=.184). These data imply that feedback did not have an
impact on performance in this task.

Comparisons between feedback and no-feedback groups
The average score on the initial set of 4 trials (pre-feedback) for subset of participants
who received feedback on trials 5-8 did not differ from that of the participants who did not
receive feedback (feedback group: n=28, no feedback group: n = 16; t(42)= -0.58, p=.57). The
difference between the average score on trials 5-8 for the no feedback and the feedback groups
was trending towards significance (t(43)=2.02, p=.05). However, one sample t-tests revealed that
neither group performed significantly greater than chance on the trials 5-8 (see table 1). This
suggests that the observed trend towards significant group differences in average score on trials
5-8 was likely due to the unequal group sizes. There were no significant differences in
performance between initially unsuccessful participants in the no feedback group and initially
unsuccessful participants in the feedback group on trials 5-8 (t(29)=-0.89, p=.38, table 1).4
Table 1: Average scores for feedback and no feedback groups
Grouping
Feedback

Average age
(months)
35

Average Score
Trials 1-4
54%

Average Score
Trials 5-8
52%

Average Score
Trials 9-12
54%

Total N
28

4

There were only 7 participants in the feedback group who scored about chance in trials 1-4 and only 5 participants
in the no-feedback group who scored above chance in trials 1-4 who also completed trials 5-8. 3 additional
participants were successful in trials 1-4 but did not complete trials 5-8. Therefore, we could not compare the
initially successful participants in the feedback group to those in the no feedback group because the sample size was
too small.

29

Episodic Object Representations
No Feedback

37.6

58%

40%

NA

16

Results: Summary of Key findings
•

There is a significant linear relationship between age as a continuous interval and test
score. 5
o Older participants (>37 months) were more likely to score above chance in trials
1-4.
o Younger children (<37 months) were more likely to score at chance in trials 1-4.

•

Feedback did not improve performance of initially unsuccessful participants.
o Participants who started off scoring at chance tended to keep scoring at chance in
subsequent trials regardless of whether or not they received feedback following
their responses in trials 5-8.

5

Children in general became fussier with repeated trials. Initially successful children may have gotten worse
because later trials may surpass the limits of their attentional resources and/or because of memory interference from
previous trials.

30

Episodic Object Representations

General Discussion:
In this study, we asked children between 2 and 4 years of age to choose between two
perceptually identical objects each with a unique history of state change. We structured the
forced choice two alternative task around a novel game context in order to investigate the
developing capacity to represent objects as tokens capable of accumulate an episodic history. We
found a significant relationship between performance on the first four trials of this task and age
as a continuous interval. That is, as age increased, score increased. Children older than 3 years of
age were more likely to score above chance in this task. Conversely, most 2-year olds and some
young 3-year olds in our dataset failed to surpass chance performance. The ability to successfully
differentiate between perceptually identical tokens on the basis of their unique histories within an
event entails tracking each token unique trajectory of change in state. Therefore, these data show
that the ability to represent changes in the state of an object begins to emerge after 30 months of
age and can be reliably observed in behavior by 52 months.

Developmental improvements in representational precision
In our study, children 3 years old and above could successfully represent objects in terms
of their histories. The location (the cup) where each object was placed following its
transformation served as the only cues to the distinct identity (and consequently the history) each
object in each trial. In our task, children only had to choose between two identical objects, but
the spatial organization of the objects did not remain constant across the encoding and retrieval
portions of each trial. They had to track each token’s trajectory of movement through space in
addition to its change in state across time. Thus, children had to discriminate between two-highly
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similar histories of state change and correctly associate these histories to the token’s final spatial
location. In order to make the correct choice, children had to attend to both histories,
discriminate between them, and assign each history to the correct object in space without the
presence of any other obvious external cues. Given that spatial location was the only physical
distinction between the two objects when children were provided the opportunity to respond,
success in this task at least in part requires the capacity to represent the spatiotemporal
trajectories of particular objects and discriminate between highly similar objects near in space.
Single-trial allocentric memory, or the ability to discriminate between multiple similar objects in
space after just a single experience also seems to improve after 3 years of age (Ribordy-Lambert,
Lavenex, Banta-Lavenex, 2016). Such shared developmental origins suggest that the protracted
trajectory for tokenization may be because we require the same relational binding machinery to
represent the contents of events across time as we do to form episodic representations of the
spatial contexts of those events. Age related improvements in the resolution at which spatial
representations can be maintained are accompanied by enhanced ability to remember the location
of hidden rewards in more complex arrays of virtually identical but spatially distinct objects, and
increased capacity to remember the locations of multiple hidden rewards within a single trial
(Ribordy-Lambert, Jabes, Banta-Lavenex, & Lavenex, 2013; Ribordy-Lambert, Lavenex, &
Banta-Lavenex, 2015; Ribordy-Lambert et al., 2016).
Coincidentally, or perhaps, consequently, the neural structures in the hippocampus that
are responsible for encoding the spatial relations between objects encountered during unfolding
experience also support the formation and maintenance of episodic memories (Collin,
Milivojevic, & Doeller, 2015; Poppenk, Evensmoen, Moscovitch, & Nadel, 2013; Nadel,
Hoscheidt, & Ryan, 2012). After all, in order to associate the correct history with the correct
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object, it is important to individuate and discriminate between similar objects cooccurring in
nearby space within the current event and between previous representations maintained in
memory. In other words, in order to know what happened to which object, and when it happened
to that object, we need to not only discriminate one object from nearby objects in space but also
between their highly similar temporal histories. In fact, this assertion is outlined in the
intersecting object histories (IOH) account for object and event representations. The IOH
suggests that the mechanism that underpins episodic representations of experience – relational
binding, the formation of indiscriminate associations between multiple objects in space (Cohen
& Eichenbaum, 1993) – may also underpin the ability to associate states of a single token in time
(Altmann & Ekves, 2019). That is to say, relational binding through time may underpin the
ability to track the history of individual tokens and use these trajectories of change across time,
space, and perceptual state to construct dynamic representations of experience (Altmann &
Ekves, 2019). The precision at which spatial information is encoded and maintained in memory
may therefore parallel the precision at which temporal information is also encoded. Therefore,
the ability to form such episodic object representations, likely requires hippocampal dependent
relational binding mechanisms.
The age effects we observed suggest that children seem to exhibit the fragile ability to
associate tokens with their histories at the same age that they first exhibit the capacity for
relational binding of the non-systematic elements of an experience into an episodic
representation (Ribordy-Lambert et al., 2015; Ribordy-Lambert et al., 2016; Newcombe,
Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, and Koski, 2014). Relational binding of episodic details is a wellknown function of the human hippocampus (Collin et al., 2015; Mclelland, McNaughton, &
O’Reilly, 1995; Hannula & Ranganath, 2008, Konkel & Cohen, 2009). The protracted
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developmental trajectory for episodic memory skills can be attributed to the maturation of the
hippocampus and surrounding structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) that extends through
early and even middle childhood (Tamnes, Bos, van de Kamp, Peters & Crone, 2014; Riggins,
Blankenship, Mulligan, Rice & Redcay, 2015; Lloyd, Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009; Demaster
& Ghetti, 2013; see Ghetti & Lee, 2011 for review). Specifically, each subfield within the
hippocampus reaches maturity at a different point in early childhood (Lavanex & Banta Lavenex,
2013). These maturational processes mediate both early memory capacity and the characteristics
of these representations (Gomez and Edgin, 2015). Infantile amnesia refers to the phenomenon
where most adults seem to have no episodic memories from the period between birth and 2 years
of age because the hippocampus has not yet matured enough to support episodic encoding
(Gogatay et al., 2006; Bhatt & Rovee-Collier, 1997; See Mullally & Maguire, 2013 for
review).The infant hippocampus undergoes a period of rapid neurogenesis and synaptic
proliferation until it reaches adult-like volume (but not necessarily structure) by two years of age
(Gogatay et al., 2006). Consequently, the early preschool years following the second birthday
mark the offset of infantile amnesia with the emergence of relational binding skills and
accordingly, the ability to form durable episodic memories (for review see Olson & Newcombe,
2014).
Although we observed clear parallels in the age at which participants succeeded in our
task and the age at which children succeed in single trial allocentric spatial memory paradigms,
our experiment did not include an allocentric spatial memory task. Therefore, we can only make
predictions about the relationship between high resolution pattern separation in the spatial
domain and the ability to track changes in the state of each object within an event. Future studies
will investigate whether or not individual differences in allocentric spatial memory predict
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success in this task by comparing participants’ behavior in this task to their performance on a
spatial memory task of comparable difficulty.

The role of feedback in episodic encoding
To our surprise, feedback did not ameliorate performance. In fact, feedback did not seem
to influence performance at all. Initially successful participants remained successful in later
trials. Participants who were initially unsuccessful did not improve after receiving feedback.
Instead, they continued to perform just as poorly after receiving corrective feedback. This
suggests that poor performance demonstrated by most participants was not due to a lack of
understanding of the task demands. The training trials adequately familiarized participants with
the expectations and structure of the paradigm.
These data imply that participants who performed poorly likely lacked the necessary
neural machinery to complete the task. In other words, even though we provided repeated and
explicit instructions children could not keep track of each object’s history because this ability
requires specific neural structure to support adult-like episodic encoding that is not yet fully
developed in the brain at such a young age. In fact, the substructures of the hippocampus that are
implicated in high resolution relational binding (e.g. Dentate Gyrus) exhibit the lengthiest
developmental trajectory of all the hippocampal subfields extending even into middle childhood
(Lavenex & Banta Lavenex, 2013). Most participants younger than 3 years of age performed at
chance even after we provided them with multiple trials of explicit feedback. This suggests that
success may necessitate high resolution relational binding abilities that require mature
hippocampal circuitry that is not immediately available to toddlers and early preschool aged
children. Future research will expand the age range of participants and explore the
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neurobiological origins of relational binding through time using fMRI. Neuroimaging studies
will provide clear evidence for the neural mechanism proposed here because they will allow us
to directly examine hippocampal activity as participants track object histories and compare this
to relational binding processes.
However, it should be noted that we only tested a particular kind of feedback in this
study: we reinforced accurate responses and corrected inaccurate responses. It could be that this
form of reinforcement-based feedback was inadequate and a different type of guidance is
necessary to bolster performance of initially unsuccessful participants. Another strategy to
potentially improve performance would be to actively provide children to provide additional cues
to alleviate some of the memory demands. For example, during the animation of the color
transformation from blue to red to blue and while taking the ball out of the box, the experimenter
could have verbally emphasized the “yumminess” (e.g. by saying “Look it is yummy! This one is
yummy! I am going to put the yummy food here!”). The same process could be repeated for the
“yucky” food as well (e.g. Look it is yucky! This one is yucky! I am going to put the yucky food
here!”). This strategy could also be implemented in the training phase. That is, rather than
waiting for the color change animation (from blue to red or yellow) is complete to label the
“yummy” and “yucky” food, we could label the objects during the transformation. By providing
verbal cues we would attenuate some of the burden on the participants’ memory system because
the participants would not have to use the semantic mapping between the color change and the
type of food in conjunction with episodic memory for the particular transformation to infer
“yumminess”. Instead, they would just have to remember the location of the ball designated by
the experimenter as yummy. While this would negate the need to track the changes in state of
each object, it would still assess whether or not the children could differentiate between 2
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perceptually identical tokens. While this would not necessarily entail tracking the histories of
state change, children would still have to track each object’s history in that they would have to
remember where the object labeled as yummy had been placed. In addition, we only provided 4
trials of feedback, younger children may have needed more repetitions in order to benefit from
the feedback. But, despite the limited scope of our conclusions, the fact that performance was not
impacted by additional feedback in our task still provides evidence in support of a shared
mechanism for representing episodic details in the spatial and temporal domains.

Precision of encoding across trials
Initially successful participants tended to become less successful with repeated trials and
in general, children became fussier over time. The deterioration in performance in our task could
be attributed to interference from prior trials and the preschoolers’ limited capacity for attention.
Even though the entire session (including both training and test trials) was very brief, lasting
only around fifteen minutes and blind coders also indicated that participants consistently
attended to the stimuli during each trial and the few trials where children were judged as
inattentive were excluded from the analysis this task placed high demands on preschoolers
limited attentional resources. In every trial of our task, the objects were unique (different blue
balls) but the correct response was always determined by the same type of transformation (the
red color change). The order of the transformations and corresponding spatiotemporal
trajectories of the objects (the side each ball was placed) were unpredictable from trial to trial.
This means that even though all trials had the same structure, each trial was unique. Within each
trial, participants had to discriminate between highly similar objects on the basis of their histories
within the current trial while inhibiting interference from an increasing number of highly similar
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previous trials. That is, relative to the current trial, prior trials overlapped in task demands,
involved objects that looked similar and possessed similar histories, occupied the same spatial
context, and took place near in time.
Later test trials may require increasingly precise token representations capable of
standing up to interference from previous highly similar trials which may place a high demand
on the children’s waning capacity for attention and inhibition. Therefore, it is not surprising that
most participants around 3.5 years of age performed above chance initially and deteriorated over
time. This also may explain why only two participants, both of whom were 52 months of age,
remained consistently successful across trials, with one of those participants able to select the
correct object in every single trial.

Conclusion:
Events entail objects that undergo change. Previous research on object individuation
reduces the contents of object representations to number and type-membership. This highly
constrained framework for object representation fails to account for tokenization because it does
not consider the history of the object independent of its current state. The current research has
shown that in order to accurately represent the particular objects (the tokens) we encounter, we
must form object representations that extend beyond what is necessary for individuation. We
must represent each object in terms of its unique episodic history. The purpose of this work has
been to show how, on the one hand, research thus far has not considered this aspect of
individuation, or “tokenization”, and on the other how the emergence of ability to represent
tokens capable of accumulating episodic histories and individuate objects on the basis of those
histories is amenable to empirical investigation.
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In conclusion, this research sheds new light on complex cognitive processes that
contribute to our ability to form flexible and precise representations that capture the idiosyncratic
properties of episodic experience. These data suggest that during the early preschool years,
children develop a fragile propensity to form token representations capable of accumulating an
episodic history. The developmental trajectory for tokenization observed here implies that the
relational binding mechanisms that underlie representations of the spatial relations between the
objects within an episode may also support representations of object histories through time.
Future research will dig deeper into the neural and developmental origins of the spatial and
temporal aspects of episodic experience.
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Appendix A: Additional Analysis of Trials 1-4
In addition to our GLM analysis, we also tested the fit of a nonlinear model. We
hypothesized that these data may be better described by an exponential function because the
relationship between the participants’ age and raw scores appeared somewhat curvilinear.
However, our regression analysis of test score on log transformed age revealed that that the
application of a nonlinear (exponential) function of the relationship between age and test score
did not fit the data any better than the GLM. Fitting a nonlinear function to the regression
equation accounts for almost the same amount of variance as the linear function (F(1,46) = 6.17, p
= .017, R2 = .12; Figure A1). The standard error of the variance explained by the residuals in the
nonlinear regression (Res. SE = 0.2202) is equivalent to the residual standard error of the linear
regression equation (Res. SE = 0.2186).

Figure A1: Testing a nonlinear relationship between age and test score on trials 1-4

The black regression line models an exponential relationship between age (log transformed) and individual test
score. The trend line closely corresponds to mean score for each age quartile (large colored dots). The scores for
each individual participant are represented by the small colored points. The dotted line at y = 50% represents chance
performance.
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We also performed a chi2 analysis on the 2 age groups (<37 months: M = 30.3 months,
range = 22-36 months, n = 24; >37 months: M = 42.6 months, range = 37-52 months, n = 24)
due to the high probability of selecting the correct object by chance (50%) and small number of
trials. This chi2 analysis allowed us to see if the proportion of successful participants differed
between groups. The criterion for success is defined as a score greater than or equal to ¾ or 75%.
Significantly more participants in the older group(>37months) demonstrated success in the first 4
test trials compared to the younger group (X2(1, N = 48) = 9.38, p=.002, figure 2A).

Figure A2: Age group differences in the number of successful participants

This graph shows differences in the number of successful participants in the younger age group (<37 months) and
the older age group (>37 months). Only 3 participants younger than 37 months of age scored ¾ (75%) or greater on
trials 1-4. Whereas a total of 13 participants older than 37 months correctly responded on at least 3 out of 4 of the
first 4 test trials. Chi2 analysis confirmed age group differences in test success (X2(1, N = 48) = 9.38, p=.002).
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Appendix B: Additional analysis of the impact of feedback on performance
We examined changes in performance before and after feedback for initially successful
and initially unsuccessful participants in the feedback group separately. Additional paired sample
t-tests indicated that participants who scored at chance in trials 1-4 (N=21, Mean age = 32,4,
Mean pre-feedback score: 44%) continued to perform at chance in trials 5-8 (M = 48%; t(20)=0.6, p=.72) and in the post feedback trial set (M = 49%; t(20)=-0.24, p=.59). Only 3 of the 21
initially unsuccessful participants achieved a score above chance in trials 9-12.6
Paired sample t-tests also revealed that participants in the feedback group who scored
above chance in trials 1-4 (N=7, Mean age = 42.9, Mean pre-feedback score: 82%) continued to
score above chance in trials 5-8 (M= 64%; t(6)= 2.08, p = .04) and in the post-feedback trials
(M= 68%; t(6)=2.5, p=.023). Although these initially successful participants remained successful
in the last set of 4 trials, it should be noted that the average score did decrease from 82% in the
pre-feedback set to 64% in the post-feedback set. In addition, only 4 of the 7 initially successful
participants actually remained successful after the first set of 4 trials. A follow-up Chi2 analysis
confirmed that the number of successful participants in the first 4 (“pre-feedback”) trials did not
significantly differ from the number of successful participants in the last 4 “post-feedback”)
trials (X2(1, N = 28) = 2.1, p=.147). However, this does not mean that all initially successful
participants remained successful. In fact, only 4 of the 7 initially successful participants
continued to be successful on the “post-feedback” block of test trials. In addition, only 3 out of
the 21 initially unsuccessful participants achieved success in the final block of trials after
receiving feedback.

6

The same 3 initially unsuccessful participants that became successful in trials 9-12(post-feedback) were also
successful in trials 5-8.
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Participants who initially scored at chance were not likely to improve after feedback.
Older participants were more likely to be initially successful and remain successful across
repeated trials. Although older participants that scored above chance initially were more likely
remain successful across subsequent trials, they tended to become less accurate in later trials
regardless of whether or not they received feedback.
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